JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. In a series of eleven markets, sellers possessed products that were exogenously designated as either grade "regular" or grade "super." Supers were valued more by buyers but grade could not be observed by buyers prior to purchase. Sellers could add costly units of quality to their products that were observable and valued by buyers. The data are analyzed with perfect information models, signaling equilibrium models, and pooling models. A variety of behaviors are observed across the eleven markets. Signaling is observed in most markets with some markets approaching the most efficient signaling equilibrium. Pooling or partial pooling occurs in a few markets. The performance seems to be sensitive to the relative cost of signaling and the market institutional setting.
INTRODUCTION
A continuing area of research in economic theory is the role markets can play in transferring information from one agent to another. In the experimental markets studied in this paper, each seller is the only one who knows all of the relevant characteristics of each of the units of a commodity in his/her possession. If the information known to sellers was also known to buyers, it would affect the value buyers placed on the units. Consequently, sellers have an interest in affecting what buyers know. The work by Akerlof [1] suggests that price alone cannot be expected to convey accurately all information from sellers to buyers while also serving a market clearing function. Signaling theory as introduced by Spence [6] and Stiglitz [7] suggests circumstances in which market processes would allow buyers to extract the sellers' information even though sellers might want to mislead buyers. The experimental markets studied here were designed to explore this latter possibility.
Theoretical discussions of signaling are focused on several issues. Equilibria may not be unique. With the Spence [6] formulation, for example, a continuum of equilibria may exist. On the other hand, nonexistence is also a problem (Rothschild and Stiglitz [5] ), and the discussion of these issues is generally sensitive to the number of agents (Riley [3] ) and the definitions of equilibrium (Wilson [8] ; Riley [4] ). Notions of reputation, gaming, and other aspects of belief structures are also important. Motivated by this literature, our research strategy was first to design markets in which several competing models can be legitimately applied and then to evaluate the models in light of the results.
In addition to questions regarding the relative accuracy of models, several questions of a qualitative nature are posed as implicit features of the overall experimental design. Participants in these markets knew much less than is frequently assumed as part of standard models. Each individual knew only his/her own parameters. The costs of signals to sellers and the value of signals to buyers, classroom with two large chalkboards, the instructions were distributed and read (see Appendix). A period zero was conducted without payment in order to check the subjects' understanding of the trading rules and accounting. The experiments typically lasted three hours after which subjects were paid. The procedure differed in experiments 11 and 12, in which the same subjects were used and paid for both sessions after the second.
The experience of the subjects differed among the experiments. Caltech undergraduates had experience in laboratory markets but not this particular series, unless otherwise indicated below. All other subjects had no experience at all in laboratory markets aside from this series. In several experiments the subjects had participated in earlier experiments in this series. The object, of course, was to study markets in which participants were already familiar with the market technology, accounting, etc. and could concentrate on the market itself. When subjects were used the second time, they were always assigned the same role, as a buyer or as a seller, that they had previously experienced. In all such experiments the parameters were changed as, contained in Table I .
Preferences were induced in the following manner. Buyer i received a redemption value Vi(g, q) for each unit purchased, which depended upon the grade, g, and the quality, q, of the unit. All buyers had identical redemption value functions but this fact was not public information. The general function was as follows, but subjects saw the discrete approximations in the Appendix which were used to reduce instruction difficulties. Since all buyers had the same redemption schedules the individual subscript is dropped. V(g, q) is the redemption value of each unit purchased. In addition, the buyer received a bonus (the amounts are in Table I ) if at least one unit was purchased.2 So, except for the first unit, each individual had a horizontal demand function at V(g, q) at all grades and qualities. Of course the buyer observes q but not g at the time of purchase. The markets proceeded in a sequence of periods. Each period each seller had exactly two units to sell so the total supply was fixed. The basic grades of the units held by an individual seller during a period were the same. Both were regulars or both were supers. For each period the designation of sellers as holding regulars or supers was made randomly subject to the constraint that half of the sellers had supers and half had regulars. While the designation of sellers as supers or regulars was made prior to the experiment, an individual seller did not know his/her designation until just before the period began. 3 Sellers could add quality, q, to a unit at a cost which depended upon the grade of the unit. In all experiments the marginal cost of adding quality to regulars was constant at $.15. The marginal cost of adding quality to supers was always lower, at $.07, in experiments 4, 5, and 12 and $.02 in all other experiments. Quality could be added "to order" so the seller had no investment decisions. It was as if units were sold to contract and quality was added according to contract specifications after the sale. Figure 1 is a graph of the unit demand and cost value functions. As can be seen, the value between supers and regulars is a constant $2.00 for every level of quality. The total cost of a unit expressed as a function of quality is also graphed. Regulars always have a higher marginal cost than supers. The marginal cost of supers is the only financial parameter which varies across experiments.
As can be seen in Table I , the unit of currency was an experimental medium called francs. The dollar value of francs varied across experiments. The experiment and individual incentives were explained to the subjects in terms of francs. The use of francs was incorporated to avoid a possible parameter bias when subjects were used in more than one experiment. For purposes of exposition, however, the discussion and analysis in the paper is in terms of dollars.
The markets consisted of a series of days or trading periods. Each period was identical except the sellers who held supers were different as described above. Bids to buy were tendered by a buyer who would orally indicate his/her letter first, then the quality and then the value of the bid. For example, "H bids a 50 at $6.00."4 This bid was written on the chalkboard, which had a horizontal quality scale line on it, below the line at the quality 50. The bid was repeated by the auctioneer, after which the floor was open for additional bids and offers. This bid remained until it was accepted or canceled. Offers to sell were announced verbally: "Q offers a 75 at $6.75." These were entered above the line at the proper quality and remained until accepted or canceled. Buyers and sellers could have many bids and offers outstanding, but sellers were required to cancel offers when they had no more units, since bids and offers were commitments to buy or sell. Acceptances could be made at any time and were finalized by the auctioneer, who entered the accepting party's number by the bid or offer and circled it as seen in Figure 2. 3The incentive and record charts were stapled together so the chart for period n was not exposed until the chart for n -1 was removed.
4This sequence has certain logistical advantages. The buyer number first indicates who has the floor should the auctioneer need to call on someone in a tie. The word "bid" alerts the proper side of the market. The quality helps position the auctioneer at the proper location to write the price when (s)he hears it. The auctioneer verbally repeats the tender after it is written and then the floor is open for more bids and offers. This latter feature slows down the process and eliminates congestion and confusion. 
2-Quality line in markets.
As contracts were made they were entered in sequence on a second chalkboard in the vector form (Buyer, Quality, Price, Seller). After the period was over the experimenter announced which sellers were selling regulars and supers so buyers could calculate their profits. This information was carried on the second chalkboard for as many periods back as possible. Thus subjects always had access to the relationship between qualities, prices, and grade from several previous periods.
In addition, starting with period 11 of experiment 7, colored chalk was used to indicate which contracts were for regulars and which were for supers. At the end of a period, as units were indexed as being regulars and supers on the second chalkboard, the auctioneer circled the regulars with green chalk and the supers with red chalk on the primary chalkboard, which contained all bids, offers and contracts. Thus when the markets were separated the left hand side of the chalkboard, with low qualities, had green circled contracts and the right had red. As will be discussed in the final section, this feature was added after it appeared that many agents were unaware of the relationship between basic grade and quality even though it was obvious if the question were asked of the data they had. Many simply never asked the question or were too busy with other aspects of the market to look.
MODELS
Five models are to be examined. These will be discussed briefly. The prediction of each model, which may not be unique because of the integer nature of the payoff schedules, is listed in Table II . Several models examined here predict that all regulars will sell at the same price, PR, and that all supers will sell at the same price, PS. Furthermore, all models predict that the quality of regulars will be the same at qR and that the quality of all supers will be the same at qs. Of course these hypotheses themselves are subject to examination but they will simply be assumed in the discussions below.
A. The Full Information Model
Markets will behave as if buyers are fully informed about which sellers have regulars and which have supers. The model can rest on axioms which have sellers wanting a "reputation of honesty" perhaps because the repeated game nature of the market makes such reputations valuable; or because special signals develop in the complicated bidding market which convey this information; or because sellers have a preference for "honesty." The law of supply and demand can be applied directly' to obtain the following formal statements: The first two simply say that price of the fixed supply is determined by the (horizontal) demand function. Equations (3) and (4) say that the value of additional quality is equal to the marginal cost of supply. Solutions to these equations for the parameters of this experiment are in Table II .
B. The Naive Model
Buyers may never notice that quality carries information about the underlying grade of the unit. Thus, they would treat the purchase as a lottery between the value of a regular and the value of a super at a given level of quality. The system of equations would be (5) and (6) below plus (3) and (4) above. The subjective probabilities are determined by rational expectations. Table II .
C. The Pure Pooling Models
Pooling is a situation in which buyers cannot distinguish regulars from supers because the qualities are identical and from this it follows that prices are identical and buyers treat the purchase as a lottery. Sellers on the other hand believe that buyers will accept nothing other than the going quality. Thus equality of quality over all units as indicated in equation (7) and equality of price over all sales, as can be deduced from (7) and (9) or (7) and (10), define a pooling equilibrium at a price level indicated by (8). A glance at the model indicates that while the equations dictate relationships among observables, a unique price and quality is not determined. Many pure pooling equilibria exist. The most efficient pure pooling equilibrium is that which maximizes consumer plus producer surplus subject to the above equilibrium conditions. This particular equilibrium is obtained by the addition of one more equation: aV(R, q) aV(S, q) aC(R, q) iaC(S, q) + = -+-. aq aq aq aq
The solutions for the experimental parameters are in Table II 
IRI+ISI
The partial pooling model, if (15) is included, specifies a price for any given pair (qR, qM). However, the model does not dictate a pair (qR, qM). So partial pooling equilibria can be identified only through the relationships indicated by the equations applied.
E. Most Efficient Signaling Equilibrium and Rothschild-Stiglitz
Signaling equilibria are those for which buyers are aware that there is a relationship between quality and grade.6 Thus, observing the quality they know the grade for certain. Sellers on the other hand have no incentive to change the quality they are offering given the grade. Generally many levels of quality will have these properties and will thus be signaling equilibria. The most efficient is the one that maximizes consumer plus producer surplus. The most efficient signaling equilibrium in the market parameters studied here satisfies condition (20) and is therefore a Rothschild-Stiglitz equilibrium as well.8
F. Inefficient Signaling Equilibria
The inefficient signaling equilibria are the solutions to (16) through (19) with the efficient solution removed. Equilibria computed on the assumption that the quality of regulars is the efficient quality are in Table II . In our parameters the profit equations (18) and (19) will both be strong inequalities at inefficient signaling equilibria. The only possible exception to the strong inequality occurs at the upper bound of qualities but for practical purposes such upper bounds do not exist. Opportunity cost is a concept necessary to make the profit equations operational. Let B(g) be the set of observed price-quality pairs traded in the market for grade g units. The profit equations (18) and (19) can then be made operational by studying .
HgI (gj) = {P -C(gi, q)(P, q) B(gj)
This set, Hgl (gj), is the set of profit numbers that would be generated if grade i units had been sold at the prices and qualities at which grade j units were actually traded. If i =j, it is the set of actual profits that occurred. If i ?j, it is a type of opportunity cost that holders of grade i experienced because they did not sell their units in the (price, quality) range in which the other grade was trading. The strategy for using these distributions will be to let a quantity, say, Ps -C(R, qs), used in the profit equations be equal to the mean of HR(S). So the mean of HR(S) is the opportunity cost of selling an R as if it were an S. The mean values of Hg, (gj) are in Table III . These will be discussed later.
The strategy for reporting the results is dictated by the results themselves. A tree that can be used as a guide through the arguments is found in the concluding section. The first conclusion differentiates ideas about pooling from other ideas. Pooling, it seems, occurs in early periods of many markets but it occurs later, after a few initial periods of adjustment, only in the experiments in which the costs of signaling supers is high ($.07 as opposed to $.02). The discussion of pooling is then postponed until a later section which focuses on those experiments alone. The second set of conclusions is developed for markets in which signaling equllibrium models might apply. These are all the markets with low signaling costs. The conclusions indicate that signaling existed in a substantial proportion of the markets. The analysis then proceeds to differentiate those markets which might be near equilibrium and attempts to ascertain which of the equilibrium models is the most appropriate. The final parts of this section return to the question of pooling and then go on to cover some miscellaneous issues regarding these markets. 
A. Pooling vs. Nonpooling
The first question pits the pooling equilibrium model against all other equilibria. In the pooling model qR = qs for all values of parameters studied here. In the equilibria predicted by nonpooling models qR < qs. Thus, an appropriate test of pooling against nonpooling is equality of quality levels of regulars and supers. The result, as summarized in the conclusion, is that pooling does not occur in markets in which signaling costs are low. When signaling costs are high a pooling hypothesis frequently cannot be rejected. However, the conclusion is sensitive to the test, as is discussed below. is relatively low (i.e. experiments 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11) . These markets are not pooled. Nevertheless, we will analyze these two experiments along with experiment 5 as those which might be pooled.
Another criterion of pooling involves the profit equations (9) and (13). The equations imply an equality between actual profits and opportunity costs (potential profits). An examination of this relationship is reserved for later.
B. Signaling vs. Nonsignaling
The analysis now turns to those markets in which qualities are separated (2,  3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 1 1) and in which signaling equilibrium models might be successfully applied. The signaling models and the naive model all predict quality separation, but the implication of such separation differs among the models in the sense that signaling models suggest that the quality will be used as a signal for the underlying grade, and thus the quality has implications for price beyond the intrinsic value of the quality.
The appropriate tool for differentiating the two classes of ideas is the excess value measure. If regulars and supers are being sold at different levels, of quality, and if the quality is used as a signal, then excess value, x(q), should be positively related to quality. Units with high quality will be recognized as supers and the price will be bid upward relative to the value of a regular at that level of quality. The conclusion is that signaling occurs in all of the "nonpooled" markets except two. The naive model predicts that the excess value of both supers and regulars should equal $1.00. In both cases the excess value is closer to 0. Risk aversion is consistent with the low price of supers but risk aversion does not account for the high quality level of the supers. The naive model predicts supers at 18 or 19 while the actual qualities are on the order of 30 or more. Thus, the behavior of both of these markets remains a matter of speculation.
C. Equilibrium vs. Disequilibrium in Signaling Markets
Experimental markets adjust over time through some yet-to-be-modeled dynamic process. There is also no generally accepted convention for defining when a market is in equilibrium. These facts create difficulties for those who wish to study and apply competing equilibrium models. The proper equilibrium model might be rejected from a competing set of models because the models were applied while the markets were still undergoing substantial adjustment.
Fortunately all signaling models agree on two dimensions of equilibrium behavior. The excess value of supers should be near $2.00 and the excess value of regulars should be slightly below zero. The strategy of model evaulation is to first identify those markets that are close to equilibrium on this criterion and define them as being in equilibrium. In the next section we will then check the quality levels in the equilibrated markets so defined, to evaluate the competing signaling models. All of the signaling models make different predictions about quality. In the last two periods of experiments 2, 7, and l Ithe compound hypothesis that the excess values of regulars and supers are drawn from distributions with means within $.05 of 0 and $2.00 respectively cannot be rejected at the .05 level of significance. If an assumption is accepted that transaction costs are about .05 then the predictions of the model are expanded to the supported range. Use of $.05 as a transaction cost is not without precedent. Commissions which are normally used to pull the data to exact equilibria are absent in these markets. Of course, one would like a better convention but currently such adjustments to models are all that exist. In experiments 6, 9, and 10 the prices of supers are never close to the equilibrium predictions in a statistical sense.
The visual impression one gets from the time series is that markets 6 and 10 are both converging to some signaling equilibrium. The qualities are well separated and the excess values are moving toward the equilibrium values as the periods replicate. The qualitative aspects of experiment 9 are similar except prices are very low. Market 9 had only two buyers but duopolies are generally unsuccessful in keeping prices far away from competitive levels in experimental markets.
D. Competing Signaling Models
Three of the markets appear to be in some sort of signaling equilibrium. The markets are 2, 7, and 11. The question is now which of the three signaling models is most appropriate. The profit and opportunity cost calculations in Table III support Table III as dictated by (18) can be rejected. The t statistics for differences are in Table III. The direction of movement in both experiments 2 and 11 is of interest and perhaps some importance. Notice that the movement of quality levels is toward the most efficient signaling equilibrium. Relative to the distance traveled by the qualities the levels are very close to the signaling equilibrium. In some respects one should conjecture that these experiments are at a most efficient signaling equilibrium. The quality levels are within $.03 in surplus terms of the most efficient signaling equilibrium. The variance in qualities is low and is actually zero for grades in some periods. Given that information can only be gathered through bids to make risky purchases this might be as close to the efficient signaling equilibrium as can be reasonably expected.
E. Pooling, Partial Pooling, and "Near" Nonexistence
The discussion now turns to markets 4, 5, and 12. These are the markets with high signaling cost. None of these three markets have separated grades'0 so some notion of pooling is called for as an explanation. The competing a priori explanations are the pooling equilibrium, the partial pooling equilibrium, and the near nonexistence of a Rothschild-Stiglitz equilibrium." Summarizing the analysis below, experiment 5 is a candidate for the pooling model and experiment 4 is a candidate for partial pooling. Experiment 12 seems to involve a substantially different phenomenon discussed in the next section. As it turns out none of these models provide a completely convincing explanation of what happened in the markets. (Table  III) . On all dimensions but one the pooling model is supported.
For the next two experiments (4 and 12) both partial pooling and "disequilibrium" concepts are of interest. Partial pooling models drop the assumption of the pooling model that only one quality exists and replace it with an assumption of two qualities (qR and qM with qR < qM). At the lower quality only regulars are traded, and the other quality involves a mix of grades with all supers trading at the higher quality and some number, a, of the regulars trading there as well. The full model is described by equations (11) through (14) and perhaps (15) as well. I See footnote 8. 12 We suspect that the bonus paid to the buyers for making at least one purchase plays a role. 13 The variance in experiments 2, 6, 9, 10, 11 tends to be many times this level. both experiments exhibit prominent behaviors contrary to the partial pooling models.
The pooling equilibrium model can be rejected in favor of partial pooling on four grounds. In both experiment 4 and experiment 12 the excess values of regulars are separated from the excess values of supers. Pooling requires equality of excess values whereas partial pooling allows inequality. (The t on mean difference is significant at .01 for three of the last four periods.) Second, the excess value of supers in both experiments is considerably above the $1.00 predicted by the pooling model. Third, an argument can be made that two quality levels, qR and qM exist rather than a single quality level. The later periods of both experiments have the low end range of the regulars anchored in the sense that some regulars and only regulars were sold at these low levels. In addition the quality of supers is bounded from below at 15 for experiment 4 and 20 for experiment 12 in the last several periods. Thus in both markets there is a quality below which sales of supers never occurs but sales of regulars do occur there so in both experiments there is a specific quality range in which a regular will be acquired with certainty.
Fourth, the profit data favor partial pooling over pooling. Both the pooling and partial pooling models have equation (13) regulars selling at the various quality levels are not equal in a manner that is hidden by a simple comparison of mean profit levels. Some regulars do sell in the super ranges and are much more profitable than regulars selling in the lower (regular) ranges of qualities. Furthermore the supers sell in two ranges of qualities rather than the one predicted by partial pooling. In summary, several aspects of the data do not support partial pooling as a general explanation for the experience of experiment 12 even though the partial pooling model is more accurate than the pooling method. In summary, the best model is partial pooling. A tempting explanation is that the Rothschild-Stiglitz equilibria do not exist as a practical matter and that the "disequilibrium" behavior we are observing represents a rejection of the most efficient signaling equilibrium model as capturing the proper equilibrium principle in favor of the Rothschild-Stiglitz concept. Two ad hoc explanations compete with that explanation. First, the high prices in experiment 4 suggest unwarranted buyer optimism. If such optimism actually exists, the remainder of the market behavior in experiment 4 can be understood without resort to the RothschildStiglitz equilibrium concept. The behavior of the other perplexing experiment, 12, can be understood in terms of special signals as discussed in the next section. Finally, this "near nonexistence" explanation has difficulty with the fact that the pooling model works so well in experiment 5.
F. Special Sources of Signals
Quality is not the only source of signals in a market. Any face-to-face market is rich with possibilities including the tone-of-voice bids or the speed of bids. Such an environment also allows for the possible development of reputations. Two instances in these experiments support the following conjecture. CONJECTURE 2: The applicability of signaling equilibrium models is sensitive to the market institutional environment. The institutional environment affects both the publicness of the signal and the nature of the signal.
Support for the first part of the conjecture is found in experiment 7 and in the difference between experiment 8 on one hand and 4 and 5 on the other. The key variable here is the experimental procedure of circling of regular contracts and super contracts with different colored chalk after the period was over and the grades were announced. The use of the chalk focused buyers on the possibility that the level of quality actually contained information. We suspect that many agents in experiments without the use of colored chalk never recognized or even suspected a positive relationship existed between quality and grade. Even though the information was in front of them they never looked. We suspect that the fall in excess value in experiment 7, beginning with period 8, reflects in part a lack of awareness on the part of a few buyers and a lack of confidence on the part of others that the quality and grade were related. The increase in excess value of supers after period 11 in experiment 7 is, we feel, due to the use of colored chalk and the information it provided.
We suspect that some sort of public recognition of a signal helps instigate the development of signaling equilibria. We also suspect that experience in the market is also important to this end.
The second instance occurs in experiment 12, in which special signals seem to have developed and generated a different type of equilibrium that reflects a combination of signaling and reputation development. Sellers of supers can make profitable trades that are unprofitable to sellers of regulars. The market institution, which included the possibility of making offers that were not accepted, could thus be used by sellers of supers to make offers that were unprofitable for regulars. Offers of quality 100 at the franc equivalent of $10, for example, began to appear early in experiment 12. These offers were never accepted but the fact that they were made suggested that the seller was a super and since seller identifications were known a reputation could form.'4 The market seemed to be adjusting along these lines with those who made offers of 100 at $10 having established a reputation as selling a super. Then the regulars began making such offers also. Even though regulars would lose considerable money if such an offer was accepted, such transactions never took place because the buyers would have also lost money. Thus a signal developed which established a reputation, seemed to affect prices and qualities, and then eroded as regulars with some perceived risk made the same offers.
Sellers in later periods of experiment 12 began developing a different strategy for reputation formation. By selling their first unit at a price and quality that was clearly reserved for supers their identity as supers became known and their second unit could be sold as if with perfect information in a range that would have been profitable for regulars. This hypothesis explains why, in experiment 12, the profits from regulars differed between the low qualities, as opposed to the price and qualities where supers tended to trade. The identity of the latter as supers was known to buyers who would thus pay high prices. In the last four periods of experiment 12 the first unit of all super sellers was sold (usually as a result of a bid) at a quality of approximately 30 and a price of about $4.50, which was 
G. Dynamics
Those markets that seem to equilibrate all have a similar dynamic pattern. The quality of supers initially separates very high above the most efficient level of signaling. The "noise" is thus eliminated. This is followed by a reduction in quality of regulars, an increase in excess values of supers and a reduction in excess values of regulars. The time structure of the latter adjustments is unclear. The quality of supers then begins to adjust downward, increasing the overall market efficiency. CONJECTURE 4: The dynamics of the signaling equilibrium is for the equilibrium level of the signaling quality to be approached from above. This conjecture might contain the seeds of an explanation of the failure of the high signaling cost markets to converge to a signaling equilibrium. With low signaling costs the range of qualities which necessarily separate the grades and are feasible from an exchange point of view is larger for the low signaling cost markets. Only the low cost markets might have converged to a separating equilibrium because it was easier for the necessary dynamic process to be initiated.
CONCLUSIONS
The tree (Figure 7) gives the structure of the paper and empirical results for all experiments, as we think the weight of evidence and conjectures support. One striking thing about the results of these experiments is the substantial differences in behavior across all experiments. Even though care was exercised to keep conditions the same across experiments no single model accounts for the behavior of all markets.
The method of analyzing the data seems a bit unorthodox. The use of a sequence of criteria to determine the data to which various models will be applied raises an obvious question. 
APPENDIX: INSTRUCTIONS

General
This is an experiment in the economics of market decision making. Various research foundations have provided funds for this research. The instructions are simple and if you follow them carefully and make good decisions you might earn a considerable amount of money, which will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment.
In this experiment we are going to conduct a market in which some of you will be buyers and some of you will be sellers in a sequence of market days or trading periods. Attached to the instructions you will find some sheets, labeled Buyer or Seller, which describe the value to you of any decisions you might make. You are not to reveal this information to anyone. It is your own private information.
The type of currency used in this market is francs. All trading and earnings will be in terms of francs. Each franc is worth dollars to you. Do not reveal this number to anyone. At the end of the experiment your francs will be converted to dollars at this rate, and you will be paid in dollars. Notice that the more francs you earn, the more dollars you earn.
Specific Instructions to Buyers
During each market period you are free to purchase from any seller or sellers as many units as you might want. The value of a unit depends upon its type and its quality. There are two types (Super and Regular) and the value of a Super for any given quality is much greater than the value of a Regular. At the time you buy a unit you will not know the type but you will know the quality. At the end of a trading period you will be told the type of each unit you bought.
The redemption value of a unit is obtained by adding its base value to its quality value. The quality value for each quality level appears in Table IA . So the value of quality is the same for both types but the base value differs.
Your payoffs are computed as follows: You will receive the difference between the redemption value of the units and the total amount you paid for the purchases. Also, you will receive a bonus for each period in which you purchase a unit.
Suppose, for example, that you buy one unit with a quality level of 1000 at a price of 1000. Assume that according to Table IA the In addition, you would collect the bonus for purchasing at least one unit that trading period.
At the time you make the purchase you should enter the quality value in row 2 of your buyer sheet and the price you paid for the unit in row 4. At the end of the period when you are told what type of units you have bought, you should enter the base value of these units in row 1. You can then calculate the total redemption value (row 1 + row 2) and enter this value in row 3. The profit for each unit is then row 3 -row 4 and this number is entered in row 5. The first unit you purchase in a trading period should be entered in the first column of your buyer sheet for that period, the second unit should be entered in the second column, and so on. If you make any purchases in a trading period, you also collect the bonus which appears in the last column. After you have calculated the profit (or loss) for each unit, record the total earnings in the blank at the bottom of your buyer sheet. When the period ends remove this sheet to reveal the buyer sheet for the next period.
Your total payoffs will be accumulated over several trading periods and the total amount will be paid to you after the experiment.
Specific Instructions to Sellers
During each market period you are free to sell to any buyer or buyers up to a total of -units. You are free to choose the quality level of all units you sell, but quality is added at a cost to you. The type of unit you will sell during a market period is given at the top of the seller sheet for that period. If the unit you are selling is a Super, the cost for each additional level of quality will be If the unit you are selling is a Regular, the cost for each additional level of quality will be . As you can see it is much easier to supply quality if you are selling a Super than it is if you are selling a Regular. The blanks on your seller sheet will help you record your profits. The sale price of the first unit you sell during the 1st period should be recorded on row (1) at the time of sale. Also, the quality level and the cost of the unit should be entered in row (2). You should then record the profits on this sale as directed in row (3). At the end of the period record the total profit on the last row on the page. Subsequent periods should be recorded similarly.
Your total profits for a trading period, which are yours to keep, are computed by adding up the profits on sales made during the trading period.
At the end of each period remove the seller sheet for that period to reveal the seller sheet for the next period. Do not look at any seller sheet until its period is announced.
Market Organization
The market for this commodity is organized as follows. The market will be conducted in a series of trading periods. Each period lasts for at most -minutes. Any buyer is free at any time during the period to make a verbal bid to buy the commodity at a specificed price and at a specified quality level, and any seller with units to sell is free to accept or not accept the bid. Likewise, anyone wishing to sell a unit is free to make a verbal offer to sell one unit at a specified price and quality level. If a bid or offer is accepted, a binding contract has been closed for a single unit at the specified price and quality level, and the contracting parties will record the contract price and quality level. Any ties in bids or acceptances will be resolved by random choice. Except for the bids and their acceptance or cancellation you are not to speak to any other subject. There are likely to be many bids that are not accepted, but you are free to keep trying. You are free to make as much profit as you can.
Trading period 0 will be a trial period to familiarize you with the procedure, and will not count toward your cash earnings. Some people rush to trade. Others find it advantageous to "shop" or spread their trading over the period. We are unaware of any particular "best" strategies and suggest that you adapt accordingly.
The record forms sometimes lead people to think in terms of "markup" and "markdown" strategies. While we see no general problems here, they can lead to occasional mistakes in computing the returns from decisions.
4. Under no circumstances may you mention anything about activities which might involve you and other participants after the experiment (i.e., no physical threats, deals to split up afterwards, or leading questions).
5. Each individual will be paid in private. Your earnings are strictly your own business. Table: REGULAR Table: SUPER 
Sec.
No.
Total
